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Abstract: This article examines the impact of German dependence on Russian gas supplies for 
Europe’s ability to apply effective sanctions against Russia. It demonstrates that by focusing 
on the environmental dimensions of energy policy and a policy of rapprochement with Russia, 
Germany has neglected the security of supply implications of its dependence on Russian gas. 
The article argues that Germany’s excessive energy dependence on Russia has limited the 
ability of the EU to challenge Russian revisionism by targeting its energy sector through 
sanctions. The article makes a number of energy policy recommendations which will be 
essential for Germany to avoid undue Russian influence on its foreign and security policies. 
The article concludes by exploring the utility of Neoclassical Realism in understanding 
Germany’s approach to energy security. In doing so it highlights the dangers of allowing 
ideology to cloud a sober assessment of the imperatives of the balance of theat. 
Word Count: 8797 
Introduction: Russian energy exports and Germany’s response to the Ukraine-Russia crisis 
The emergence of Russia as a revisionist state determined to re-exert its status as the 
predominant power in post-Soviet space signals the inception of a dangerous era in European 
security. Russia’s use of military force in Crimea and support for pro-Russian separatists in 
eastern Ukraine raises the threat that it may repeat such actions in other east European and 
Central Asian states with large Russian minorities. Given the inappropriateness of military 
action, economic sanctions, despite their questionable effectiveness, offer the best coercive 
tool that the Western powers can employ to force change in the strategic calculus of the 
Russian foreign policy elite.1 Due to the widespread domestic support for President Vladimir 
Putin’s intervention in Ukraine and the capacity of the Russian core executive to mould public 
opinion, only sanctions which significantly hit living standards by targeting revenues from 
Russia’s oil exports will have a tangible impact on Russian policy.2  
EU sanctions have targeted individuals close to President Putin and Russia’s banking, defence 
and energy sectors by restricting access to capital markets, banning the export of oil 
exploration technology and arms exports.3 The sanctions are, however, insufficient to force 
change in Russian foreign policy. While blocking the transfer of technological expertise in oil 
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exploration will cause difficulties for Russia, the technology itself can be sourced from China.4 
Restrictions on Russia’s ability to access international financial markets have played a role in 
the recent slowdown of the Russian economy, however the drop in economic growth is also 
the result of falling oil prices, lack of structural reforms to the Russian economy and poor 
investment in infrastructure and research and development.5 In short, EU sanctions have 
shied away from reducing imports of Russian natural gas and oil, which form the bedrock of 
the Russian economy and have been too weak to incite change in Russian policy. 
The major Western powers, who have divergent commercial and energy relationships with 
Russia, have displayed differentiated willingness to impose tough sanctions on Russia’s 
energy sector. The weak US trade and energy relationship with Russia restricts its ability to 
apply sanctions against Russia.6  However, the EU is a key market for Russian oil and gas 
exports which, at face value, endows Europe with the potential to place crippling sanctions 
on Russia. The EU imports 35 percent of its crude oil and 30 percent of its natural gas from 
Russia.7 Although Europe would be able to compensate for Russian oil imports through tanker 
deliveries, its ability to target Russian oil exports is compromised by the difficulties that 
Europe faces in diversifying gas imports.  
Some EU states, such as the UK and France, import relatively little gas from Russia, however 
others, including Germany and several CEE states are highly-dependent on Russian gas.8  This 
divergent dependence on Russian gas imports has an important impact on the willingness of 
key European states to place sanctions on Russia’s energy sector. Britain has been keen to 
avoid jeopardising Russian investment in the City of London and also has commercial interests 
in Russia that was the UK’s 14th largest export market in 2013.9 Hence during sanction 
negotiations in 2014 the UK pushed for more stringent sanctions covering gas and oil imports 
and arms exports.10 France, in contrast, has championed financial sector sanctions, while 
seeking to minimise the impact on its armaments industry.11  
Of the major West European powers, Germany has been most active in attempting to limit 
EU sanctions against Russia’s energy sector.12 In initial sanction negotiations Germany was 
particularly keen to keep oil and gas off the agenda.13 While Russia is an important market for 
German products and services, German dependence on Russian oil and gas is especially 
pronounced, accounting for 39 percent of German oil imports and 36 percent of gas imports.14  
Chancellor Angela Merkel has threatened Russia with further sanctions should it not stem the 
flow of militants and weapons into eastern Ukraine, yet Germany is unwilling to back 
measures which could have an immediate impact on Russian revenue from energy exports.15  
Although energy has a significant impact on national security, the relationship between 
energy security, especially gas supplies, and European foreign policy decision-making has 
received limited scholarly attention.16 Hence this article breaks new ground by examining the 
impact of energy security on German policy toward EU sanctions against Russia. This issue is 
central to European security. Given Russia’s failure to adhere to the terms of the Minsk 
agreements, the need to place more severe sanctions on Russia is likely to re-emerge. German 
support for sanctions targeting Russia’s oil and gas sectors will be essential in such a context.17 
Europe’s differentiated dependence on Russian gas threatens not only to undermine the 
cohesion of the EU in tackling Russian revisionism, but will also have important knock-on 
effects for European states’ willingness to undertake more extensive pooling and sharing of 
military forces and capabilities through the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy and 
NATO’s Smart Defence.18  
The article begins by examining Germany’s broader post-Cold War Russian policy and its 
impact on German policy toward sanctions against Russia. It highlights that during the early 
post-Cold War era Germany focused on the capacity of economic interdependence to foster 
change in Russian domestic and foreign policies. The article finds that while German policy is 
now characterised by a more sober assessment of Russian intentions, the material path 
dependencies that rapprochement in German-Russian relations has established, particularly 
the emphasis on affordability over security of supply in gas imports, limits Germany’s ability 
to place coercive pressure on Russia.19 The article proceeds by demonstrating how the 
emphasis on renewable energies and the poor Europeanisation of German energy policy is a 
strategic miscalculation that will worsen Germany’s reliance on Russian gas. The article makes 
two recommendations for German energy policy to enhance security of supply which will be 
vital in to ensure that the EU is able to respond to Russian revisionism in a more effective 
manner. The conclusions reflect upon the theoretical implications of the analysis. They 
uncover important implications for the study of German foreign and security policy by 
illustrating the utility of a Neoclasscial Realist framework for analysis that challenges the 
dominance of Constructivist approaches, especially the concept of ‘civilian power’. It 
highlights, in particular, the dangers of allowing ideology and short-term domestic and 
economic imperatives to guide foreign and security policy decision-making. 
Germany’s Russia policy: from special relationship to scepticism 
German policy toward Russia has undergone significant change during the post-Cold War era, 
from rapprochement through enhanced commercial ties to wariness of Russia’s strategic 
ambitions. Buoyed by gratitude to Russia for supporting reunification, Germany sought a 
‘strategic partnership’ with Russia under Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder (1998-2005).20 
Although Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (1998-2005) was critical of Russia’s human rights 
record, the Chancellor’s Office took the lead in defining Germany’s relationship with Russia.21 
Chancellor Schroeder’s close personal relationship with President Putin, Germany’s growing 
demand for gas and the interests of German energy companies in expanding their role in 
importing Russian gas to Europe culminated in the 2005 agreement to develop the Nord 
Stream gas pipeline allowing Russia to transport gas directly to Germany.22 However, Nord 
Stream endowed Moscow with greater ability to control the European energy market by 
separating the energy supplies of Eastern and Western Europe.23  
During the CDU/CSU/SPD Grand Coalition (2005-09), the Foreign Ministry under Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier played a more active role in Germany’s Russia policy and provided an underlying 
narrative to frame the strategic partnership. Steinmeier adopted a policy of Wandel durch 
Verflechtung (change through interdependence) in German-Russian relations that displayed 
close parallels with Ostpolitik and was also rooted within civilian power approaches to foreign 
policy which were especially prominent within the German foreign ministry.24 Steinmeier 
sought to use German economic influence as Russia’s second largest export market to 
encourage democratic political reforms and lock Russia into Western political and economic 
practises. Wandel durch Verflechtung was framed as dovetailing with the 1997 EU Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement principles of promoting democratic transformation and 
economic reform in Russia and as important contribution to EU Russian policy.25 However, 
Germany’s Russian policy was insufficiently Europeanised and by the end of 2005-09 Grand 
Coalition Germany had become Russia’s closest European partner, amounting to what many 
commentators termed a ‘special relationship’.26  
The 2009 election of the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition signalled the beginning of a shift in 
Germany’s Russian policy. Chancellor Merkel holds a sceptical opinion of Russian intentions, 
especially following Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia.27 Accordingly, the 2009-13 
CDU/CSU/FDP coalition agreement did not focus on German-Russian relations and eschewed 
references to a strategic partnership.28 Nevertheless, Merkel saw in the election of President 
Dmitry Medvedev (2008-12) hope that democratic reforms would be bolstered and that a 
long-term transformation of Russian-European relations might take place.29 Hence the 2009-
13 FDP/CSU/CSU coalition did not challenge the overall approach of Wandel durch 
Verflechtung.  
The 2013 CDU/CSU/SPD coalition agreement devotes an entire sub-section to German-
Russian relations.30 While the sub-section outlines Germany’s intention to continue to seek 
partnership, it also highlights the need for a more critical approach to Russia’s democratic 
reforms. Crucially, it recognises the need to avoid being drawn into a relationship of 
dependence on Russia and that any ‘special relationship’ should give way to a more 
coordinated approach to Russia through the EU. The agreement indicates a realisation that 
Wandel durch Verflechtung has rendered little tangible change in Russian domestic and 
foreign policy and that the ‘special relationship’ is over.31   
Yet Germany’s approach to the Ukraine-Russia crisis continues to be characterised by 
ambiguity. Russian aggression is met with strong rhetoric, but unwillingness to champion 
sanctions on Russia’s energy sector which could force change in foreign policy. Germany must, 
alongside its European partners and the US, send unequivocal signals to Russia that military 
aggression and arming insurrection movements will not be tolerated on the European 
continent. The reticence of the core executive to impose sanctions which target the Russian 
people and to ensure the maintenance of a multilateral approach to sanctions have played a 
role in informing Germany’s restrained approach.32 However, as the following sections 
demonstrate, the material forces unleashed by Wandel durch Verflechtung, particularly 
dependence on Russian gas, place significant constraints on Germany’s ability to apply 
sanctions against Russia’s energy sector and provide a powerful incentive for a moderate 
stance toward the severity of sanctions.   
Oil exports: a difficult but potent tool to leverage against Russia   
Russia’s economic dependence on oil exports to Europe grants European states, especially 
Germany, strong leverage over the Russian economy.  In 2012 oil revenues contributed to 42 
percent of Russia’s state budget and in 2013 80 percent of Russian oil exports went to 
European countries.33 Germany is a key consumer of Russian oil which accounts for 39 percent 
of Germany’s oil consumption.34 The recession initiated by the 2014 drop in oil prices has 
demonstrated the dependence of the Russian economy on oil revenue and the potential 
pressure that European states could exert on Russia should they choose to limit Russian oil 
imports.35 Nevertheless, although Russia would suffer the most serious economic 
consequences of a reduction of oil exports to Europe, such sanctions would not be without 
consequences for Germany and Europe.   
First, while Russian oil could be replaced by supplies from the world market, much of Russian 
oil is delivered to Germany and other European states through pipelines36 Compensating for 
Russian pipeline oil through tanker deliveries would lead to increased costs for consumers.37 
The lack of refinery capacity in Balkan states, such as Bulgaria, would also make it difficult for 
such states to receive tanker deliveries.38 Second, Russia is establishing new oil export 
customers who will reduce its dependence on the European market over the medium- to 
long-term. In June 2013 Russia signed an agreement with China to export $270 billion of oil 
over a 25-year period.39 This deal will form part of an increasing trend of Russian oil exports 
to the East over the next decade and Russia intends to double oil sales to Asia by 2035.40  
However, these difficulties in exploiting Russian dependence on oil exports to Europe are not 
insurmountable and oil, for the time being, forms a key tool for European states to place 
pressure on the Russian economy. Nevertheless, as the following sections highlight, it is 
Russia’s ability to damage the German economy by restricting gas exports that forms the most 
significant limitation on Europe’s capacity to place hard-hitting sanctions on the Russian oil 
sector.  
Germany’s dependence on Russian gas: a strategic miscalculation 
In 1990 natural gas accounted for 15.4 percent of Germany’s Total Primary Energy Supply 
(TPES).41 By 2010 it constituted 22 percent of TPES and is predicted by the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) to increase to 24 percent by 2025.42 The construction of gas pipelines 
during the 1970s and early 1980s left Germany reliant on Russia for 17 percent of its gas 
imports upon reunification.43 However, decisions taken at the height of ‘special relationship’ 
with Russia, notably to construct Nord Stream and to emphasise affordability over supply 
security, deepened this dependence. Germany now relies on Russia for 36 percent of its 
natural gas imports.44 German gas companies have also negotiated favourable gas prices with 
Gazprom compared to CEE states, thereby providing a strong incentive for Germany to 
neglect supply security.45 
The likelihood of Russia successfully using gas supplies as a tool of foreign policy against 
Germany appears, at first glance, to be low. Germany has gas storage facilities with a capacity 
of 20.4 billion cubic meters (Bcm), shielding it from the immediate effects of a Russian 
shutdown for several months or weeks (depending on weather conditions).46 Furthermore, 
commentators emphasise the importance of gas exports to the Russian economy which 
comprise some five percent of Russia’s national budget.47 As the German Minister of 
Economic Affairs and Energy, Sigmar Gabriel argues: ‘even in the darkest hours of the Cold 
War, Russia kept to its contracts’.48  
However, this relaxed approach to the threat of Russian coercion is misguided. First, Germany 
would come under pressure to share its gas reserves with CEE states in the event of crisis. 
Second, as outlined above, German dependence on Russian gas was less pronounced during 
the Cold War. Third, the geopolitical context of German-Russian relations has changed 
significantly since the Cold War, creating greater opportunities for Russia to use gas exports 
as a coercive tool against Germany. During the Cold War the US was highly-committed to 
defending Europe’s territorial integrity. While the US is unlikely to rescind its commitment to 
the collective defence of NATO, the growing Asia-Pacific focus of US security policy will leave 
Europe to pick up a greater share of burden of the security burden within the Alliance. Given 
the inability of many European states to meet NATO’s two percent of GDP target for defence 
spending and the limited successes of NATO and EU pooling and sharing initiatives, Europe 
may struggle to provide security for its Eastern members.49 Furthermore, Russia’s use of 
military aggression to secure influence in post-Soviet space points to its status as a revisionist 
power that will not easily rescind geopolitical ambitions under threat of sanctions, unless they 
are highly-punitive.50 In addition while gas sales contribute to five percent of Russia’s national 
budget, this figure pales in comparison to oil which comprises half the revenue of the Russian 
state.51  
Finally, Russia is beginning to reduce its dependence on Western Europe for gas exports. In 
May 2014 Russia signed a deal to export 38 Bcm of gas annually to China from 2018.52 This 
agreement was followed by a November 2014 agreement to supply China with a further 
30Bcm of gas per year.53 While these exports are small compared with the 178.6 Bcm of gas 
exported annually to Europe, Russia plans, beyond 2018, to quintuple overall gas exports to 
Asia by 2035.54 Asian exports will be accompanied by an increase in liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
exports to the Middle East.55 In short, Russia will be in a stronger position to use gas as a 
political bargaining chip over the medium-term. Yet, as the following sections highlight, 
Germany, the major West European power most exposed to Russian gas imports, has taken 
insufficient measures to enhance supply security. 
The over-optimism of the Energiewende 
The first warning signs of the dangers of dependence on Russian gas emerged in the January 
2006 Russia-Ukraine gas conflict. Following this crisis the German government initiated an 
energy policy review resulting in the 2007 Integrated Energy and Climate Programme (IECP). 
The IECP contained measures to enhance energy efficiency and increase the proportion of 
renewable energy in Germany’s electricity supply from 13 percent to 25-30 percent by 2020.56 
However, while the Foreign Ministry played a stronger role in the energy policy review than 
in previous energy policy decision-making, it was dominated by advocates of Wandel durch 
Verflechtung. As a consequence, the IECP reflected a compromise between the Environment 
Ministry’s concerns about climate change and the Ministry of Economics and Technology’s 
focus on energy affordability.57  
The 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas crisis and concerns about climate change spurred the 
CDU/CSU/FDP coalition to launch a new energy policy review.58 However, upon its release the 
2010 Energy Concept focused, like the IECP, on tackling climate change rather than dealing 
explicitly with supply security and gas import diversification. The 2010 Energy Concept, 
heralded as an ‘Energiewende’ (energy transition), set even bolder renewable targets than 
the IECP, aiming to reduce reliance on coal and gas by achieving 30 percent of German gross 
energy consumption from renewables by 2020 and 60 percent by 2050.59 Between 2011 and 
2013 Germany witnessed a one third drop in the amount of electricity produced from gas as 
solar power began to provide power during times of peak consumption.60 However this 
progress in the reduction of gas consumption will be difficult to sustain.  
Germany’s ability to meet the targets of the Energy Concept is uncertain due to the 
Energiewende’s financial and technical complexities.61 Germany is, for example, facing 
difficulties in attaining sufficient electricity storage capacity during lulls in energy production. 
Solving this problem will be problematic due to the role of wind power in the Energiewende 
that cannot be easily captured by batteries.62 Alternative technologies for electricity storage 
remain under development.63 Hence in its 2013 report on Germany the IEA notes that 
Germany will become more reliant on gas over the coming decade as it offers the best balance 
of cost and carbon-dioxide emissions when offsetting fluctuations in wind and solar output.64  
Crucially, the German government is finding it increasingly difficult to implement the 
Energiewende as costs spiral. In 2014 consumers paid €23.6 Billion through the Renewable 
Energy Surcharge (EEG) to help fund the Energiewende and households have experienced an 
80 percent increase in real-term electricity prices since 2000.65 While the EEG was reformed 
in April 2014 to force energy-intensive industry to make a stronger contribution, the costs of 
the Energiewende are set to rise, with negative implications for economic growth.66 
Germany’s electricity distribution and transmission networks also require heavy investment 
to transfer energy from north of Germany to the south, where the majority of German 
industry is based.67  Progress in upgrading these networks has been patchy. This is due to 
fears about the costs, which will amount to between €47.5 billion and €72.5 billion over the 
next ten years and add a greater burden to consumers.68 Poor cooperation between the 
German regions and the Federal Network Agency and local opposition has also undermined 
network improvements.69 Tellingly, Sigmar Gabriel outlined in April 2014 that Germany is 
facing the failure of the Energiewende due to an underestimation of its complexity and cost.70  
Germany’s ability to wean itself off Russian gas has also been compromised by the 2011 
decision to accelerate the phase-out of nuclear power that, in 2010, comprised 22 percent of 
electricity production.71 This has led to an increase in German coal consumption for electricity 
production, hence it is expected that the percentage of gas in the electricity mix is unlikely to 
fall further to ensure that Germany can reduce its coal consumption.72 Furthermore, gas 
provides just under 50 percent of German heating. Building retrofitting and alternative heat 
sources will lower total German gas consumption from a level of 900 terawatt hours (TWh) in 
2013 to 683 TWh by 2025.73 While these reductions would appear to go some way to 
significantly offsetting Germany’s 315 TWh gas imports from Russia, projected reductions in 
Dutch and Norwegian gas imports during this period as North Sea gas supplies dwindle will 
leave Russian gas an essential part of Germany’s energy mix.74 In short, it is unlikely that 
Germany will meet targets of the 2010 Energy Concept and will continue to rely heavily on 
Russian gas. 
The failure to Europeanize the Energiewende and champion EU energy supply security 
initiatives  
German dependence on Russian gas has also been enhanced by the difficulties that Germany 
has faced in developing the Energiewende’s European dimension and its failure to provide 
sufficient support for the Commission’s efforts to improve energy supply security.75 Before 
and following the 2006/09 gas crises the Commission launched several gas supply security 
initiatives. These initiatives include the 2008 Second Strategic Energy Review that outlined, 
amongst other measures, the need to diversify gas supplies through the Mediterranean and 
Southern Corridor and the 2009 Third Energy Package that seeks to enhance Europe’s energy 
efficiency and self-sufficiency by pushing ahead with the internal energy market.76 Yet, 
despite these initiatives, the EU was largely unprepared for the energy security implications 
of the Ukraine-Russia crisis. Several major problems persist in EU energy policy which 
exacerbate dependence on Russian gas and weaken the EU’s ability to challenge Russian 
revisionism.  
First, the energy relations of European states with external suppliers are fragmented, with 
individual member states negotiating separate deals with Gazprom and other energy 
suppliers. Second, the EU has been slow to diversify gas imports, with Russia remaining the 
dominant source. The South Stream project, that would have supplied Europe with 63bn cubic 
meters of Russian natural gas per year, was cancelled in December 2014 following opposition 
from the Commission that found the project in contravention of EU rules on unbundling gas 
supply and transport.77 However, EU states have been slow to act on the Commission’s 
warnings about the security risks associated with high-levels of dependence on Gazprom. 
Third, the EU has encountered serious difficulties in developing the infrastructure to allow 
LNG to be transferred between EU states in gas crises.78  
Fourth, European states have made limited progress in developing the ‘hardware’ (electricity 
and gas transmission infrastructure) and the ‘software’ (the regulation) of the internal energy 
market. As a consequence the EU energy market is characterised by national ‘energy islands’ 
which act to the detriment of energy efficiency and the expansion of renewable energy, 
limiting European energy self-sufficiency.79 Finally, the internal energy market is undermined 
by the EU’s poor progress in decarbonizing its economy. 
Three factors have led Germany to fail to provide leadership on behalf of European energy 
supply security. First, the sheer weight of issues which needed to be decided during the 
immediate period following the launch of the Energiewende and phase out of nuclear power 
(2010-12) meant that almost weekly cabinet decisions on energy policy were held. This led to 
a high-degree of confusion about the implications of the Energiewende for Germany’s 
European partners.80  
Second, the Foreign Ministry, that is responsible for coordinating Germany’s position on EU 
energy policy issues, was unable to broker agreement between the Environment Ministry, 
that wished to place pressure on other European states to promote renewable energy, and 
the Economics Ministry, that wanted a stronger focus on the opportunities the EU could 
provide to deliver greater cost-effectiveness in energy.81 In the words of one source, the 
Foreign Ministry was ‘screaming at both Ministries to find consensus’, but to little avail.82 
Hence EU-level agreements were often developed with little German input.83 This problem 
was exacerbated by the lack of funding available to the Foreign Ministry during these years 
to appoint personnel to deal with the European implications of the Energiewende.84  
The problem of inter-ministerial contestation has largely been resolved through the 2013 
establishment of the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy that has proved more adept at 
developing common positions with the Environment Ministry.85 The ability of the Foreign 
Ministry to coordinate Germany’s position on EU energy policy and negotiate with European 
partners has also been enhanced through the allocation of greater resources and personnel 
to deal with the foreign policy implications of the Energiewende.86  
The final and most important factor is the influence of civilian power within the foreign policy 
community and the consequent approach of Wandel durch Verflechtung with Russia that led 
the German political elite to fail to grasp the dangerous security ramifications of dependence 
on Russian gas.87 While the ‘special relationship’ is over, the comparatively low prices that 
German companies pay for Russian gas in comparison with CEE states continue to play an 
important role in reducing the incentive to support EU initiatives to enhance gas supply 
security.88  Hence Germany’s leadership on behalf of improving European gas transmission 
networks and the internal energy market continues to lack urgency.89  
The way forward: the imperative of German leadership on the Energy Union 
While Germany has resolved several of the factors which have undermined the 
Europeanisation of its energy policy, Germany must take two concrete steps to enhance gas 
supply security. First, although the renewable aims of the Energiewende are laudable, greater 
balance needs to be struck between gas supply security and tackling climate change. This will 
require a more realistic assessment of Germany’s ability to reduce gas consumption and 
investment in alternative gas supplies. LNG, when combined with increased imports from 
Norway, could compensate for Russian gas should Russia restrict gas exports to Germany.90  
Hence Germany must develop the long-proposed LNG terminal in Wilhelmshaven to allow it 
take advantage of LNG imports, should Russia use gas supplies in a coercive manner. Under 
the circumstances of a shutdown of Russian gas supplies, Europe’s existing LNG terminals 
would struggle to meet demand. Given the strong relationship between key German gas 
companies such as E.ON and RWE and Gazprom and the current lack of financial incentive for 
private sector investment in the project, this project will necessitate investment from the 
state. 91 
Second, and most importantly, as Europe’s economic and political heavyweight Germany 
must shoulder greater responsibility for promoting the Energy Union that was launched in 
April 2014 by former Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. The Commission’s Energy Union 
Package of February 2015 waters down contentious proposals included in the initial Polish-
led initiative, including the collective bargaining of gas contracts with third parties, increasing 
coal consumption and fracking, which had encountered significant resistance from German 
policy-makers. It contains four key proposals which will be highly-beneficial to Germany and 
Europe by avoiding ‘energy islands’, improving energy efficiency, bolstering efforts to increase 
the share of renewables in the energy mix and diversifying gas imports.   
First, the Energy Union seeks to develop the EU’s regulatory powers which will be vital in 
ensuring the completion of the internal energy market through the stricter enforcement of 
the 2009 3rd Internal Energy Market Package, particularly in ensuring the independence of 
energy regulators and unbundling of energy supply and distribution. The Energy Union 
highlights the imperative of as antitrust enforcement to stop territorial restrictions in supply 
contracts and the need to enforce competition law to regulate the development of energy 
prices. Furthermore, the Energy Union plans to reinforce the powers of the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators to strengthen its ability to guide the completion of the 
internal energy market.92 In addition, the Energy Union details the Commission’s plans to 
more rigorously enforce the April 2014 Environmental and State Aid Guidelines, which seek 
to reduce the distorting effect of national renewable energy subsidies on the internal energy 
market.93  The Energy Union also emphasizes Commission’s intent to use competition law to 
stop below-cost regulated energy prices.94  
Second, the Energy Union outlines the plans of the Commission to support the construction 
of LNG terminals for CEE states and to develop the pipeline infrastructure to allow CEE states 
to compensate for Russian gas in the event of a gas crisis.95  The Energy Union also prioritises 
establishing of greater interconnection between member-state electricity networks.96  Given 
the future role of renewables in Europe’s energy supply, instruments such as the Connecting 
Europe Facility and European Fund for Strategic Investments (which remain heavily 
dependent upon leveraging private sector investment) are well-suited to attracting 
investment for projects associated with Europe’s electricity infrastructure. However, a 
number of investments in gas infrastructure are to be used only in crisis situations and may 
not generate profit over the long-term. Consequently Europe is failing to address the 
infrastructure bottlenecks necessary to overcome Europe’s dependence on Russian gas.97 
Hence German leadership will be essential to gather support for greater EU investment in 
vital infrastructure projects to ensure the success of the Energiewende and lessen the 
vulnerability of CEE states to a loss of Russian gas.98   
Third, the Energy Union notes the imperative of meeting the 2009 Renewable Energy 
Directive (2009/28/EC) which sets national targets for the percentage of TPES to be achieved 
from renewables by 2020. However, the Commission’s ability to enforce this directive is 
constrained by its failure to provide a list of interim targets for member states. German 
leadership will, therefore, be necessary to encourage laggard states such as France, Poland 
and the UK to make greater progress in meeting their targets.99 The Energy Union also 
includes a number of important initiatives to help stimulate greater energy efficiency as part 
of a review of the EU’s energy efficiency target of 30% by 2030, especially in the building and 
transport sectors.100   
Finally, the Energy Union Package highlights the importance of diversifying Europe’s gas 
imports. Given the uncertainties surrounding the lifting of international sanctions on Iran in 
February 2015, the Energy Union does not mention the potential to establish gas deals with 
Tehran. However, the July 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and world powers led the 
Commission and several EU countries, including Germany, to explore the possibility of 
importing 25-35 Bcm of LNG to Europe by 2030.101   
The Energy Union Package focuses instead on the potential for the EU to increase gas imports 
from the Caspian Sea region, especially Turkmenistan, which holds the world’s fourth largest 
gas supplies and has the ability to supply Europe with a significantly greater quantity of gas 
than Iran.102 Europe’s ability to access Central Asian gas has been hampered by disputes over 
the Caspian Sea’s legal status and the difficulty of securing agreement with Turkmenistan that 
prioritised exports to China and Russia.103  However, the current political and economic 
contexts provide opportunities to push ahead with accessing supplies from the region.   
Current pipeline projects such as the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (completion date 2019) and 
Trans-Anatolian pipeline (completion date 2018), will supply Europe with 16Bcm and 10Bcm 
of gas per year respectively.104 However, the collapse of South Stream provides an 
opportunity to secure investment from the private sector for the Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) 
that will supply gas from Turkmenistan. The urgency of accessing supplies from the Caspian 
Sea region is also reinforced by the limited ability of European states to import North African 
and Iraqi gas due to political instability in the MENA region, while reserves in the Eastern 
Mediterranean will supply only 10Bcm of gas to the EU annually.105 In addition, Turkmenistan 
has also become more open to diversifying exports following recent Russian reductions in gas 
imports from the country.106  
Maros Sefcovic, the Commission Vice-President has been courting Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan to seek support for the TCP.107 However, securing the agreement of these 
states will be a delicate process given their continued disputes over energy resources in the 
Caspian Sea.108 Should Chancellor Merkel lend her diplomatic weight and acumen to this 
process, and to ensuring private sector commitment to the project in which German energy 
companies could play a significant role, it would greatly benefit Europe’s supply security.  
Conclusions: Neoclassical realism and Germany’s approach to Russian revisionism 
In summary, the focus on Wandel durch Verflechtung in German-Russian relations and the 
over-optimism of the Energiewende have led Germany to neglect gas supply security.109 
Inadequate German leadership on the single energy market and its failure to support the 
Commission’s efforts to diversify gas supplies has also contributed to the excessive 
dependence on Russian gas displayed by several CEE states.110 Furthermore, the difficulties 
associated with the Energiewende are likely to leave Germany more dependent on Russian 
gas over the next decade and increasingly at the mercy of Russian coercion. As a source within 
the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy highlights: ‘Germany will not agree to sanctions 
against Russian oil and gas exports. If Russia were to cut gas exports it would be catastrophic 
for the German economy. Gas will continue to play a central role in our energy mix in the 
years to come and this gives Russia a very important position’.111 
These observations raise important implications for theorising German foreign and security 
policy. Constructivist approaches enjoy a dominant position in conceptualising German 
foreign and security policy. Hans Maull’s concept of civilian power that emphasises the impact 
of institutionally-embedded ideas rooted in Germany’s past as the key driver of German 
decision-making is especially prominent.112 The article’s findings do not challenge the 
assertion that such ideational factors have been a central variable in shaping German policy 
toward Russia and energy security. Yet the article does not validate the arguments of 
Constructivists. Rather, it highlights the dangers of allowing ideology to cloud a rational 
assessment of national interests.  
The findings of the article dovetail closely with the insights of Neoclassical Realism (NCR). NCR 
argues that the balance of power forms the key independent variable driving foreign, defence 
and security policy decision-making. However, NCR also argues that domestic factors 
including nationalism, ideology and the institutional structure of the state, form important 
intervening variables which slow down or speed up convergence with the imperatives of the 
international system.113 Should states fail to act in accordance with these imperatives they 
will face a loss in relative power.114  
However, while the majority of NCR scholars focus on balance of power theory in 
understanding the role of systemic forces, the theory is only of limited utility in understanding 
why European states have united with the US to balance Russian power. Balance of power 
theory argues that the geographical position, economic power and population size of the 
major West European Powers (Britain, France and Germany) leave them subject to relatively 
similar pressures from the international system.115 However, balance of power theory also 
suggests that states balance primarily against capabilities, leading Neorealists such as Posen 
to argue that the EU, through the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), is undertaking 
a process of ‘soft balancing’ US power to check the rise of a unipolar hegemon.116  
Yet there is little evidence of ‘soft balancing’ by the EU over the post-Cold War era. Instead, 
West European states have undertaken a process of ‘reformed bandwagoning’ on US power, 
where the heavy dependence of West European states on the US security guarantee through 
NATO has been gradually attenuated through the development of CSDP as a means to  pick 
up security challenges within Europe’s geopolitical neighbourhood in cases of US 
disinterest.117 Hence balance of power theory must be supplemented by integrating the 
insights of Walt’s ‘balance of threat’ theory which notes that an enemy (such as Russia) who 
is less powerful than the unipolar leader, but one who is more geographically proximate, has 
offensive capabilities and offensive intentions will pose a greater threat than the dominant 
state in the international system.118  
However, domestic factors form important intervening variables which restrict the extent to 
which the Western powers are able to undertake coordinated action to tackle Russian 
revisionism by limiting their ability to apply effective sanctions against Russia’s energy sector. 
As this article has demonstrated, in the case of Germany, these domestic variables have been 
both ideational and material. Two ideological factors have been especially prominent. First, 
while Germany’s efforts to tackle climate change are laudable, the dominance of the 
environmental lobby has fostered neglect of gas supply security. Second, the dominance of 
civilian power approaches within the core executive emphasising the potential for ‘Wandel 
durch Verflechtung’ have led to a failure to recognise the importance of the security 
dimensions of the German-Russian energy relationship.  
As balance of threat theory expects, Wandel durch Verflechtung has given way to greater 
scepticism of Russian intentions. However, it has left material path dependencies which form 
powerful constraints on the core executive’s ability to enhance gas supply security at the 
national and EU levels: the desire of the German energy industry to protect its privileged 
relationship with Gazprom and the unwillingness of German politicians to deal with the 
political implications of the increased cost to consumers associated with reducing 
dependence on Russian gas.  Hence Germany risks losing relative power over the medium-
term by signalling to Russia that it is able to use force to expand its sphere of influence in 
post-Soviet space with relative impunity. As Rathburn notes: ‘The more the state comes to be 
captured by parochial actors, and the more elites come to believe in alternative social 
constructions of reality different from the objective reality outlined by neorealism, the more 
severe the penalty.’119 
It is therefore vital that gas supply security is allocated greater priority as an issue of national 
security in Germany. Several parliamentarians have begun to recognise the need to diversify 
gas supplies, including Thomas Bareiss (CDU/CSU Energy Policy Coordinator), Michael Fuchs 
(Deputy Chair, CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group) and Peter Ramsauer (Chair, Bundestag 
Committee on Economic Affairs).120  Chancellor Merkel must champion this emerging 
coalition by adopting a stronger leadership role in energy security and place pressure on the 
Foreign Ministry and Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy to ensure greater gas supply 
security.121  
Such leadership will necessitate Chancellor Merkel to spend political capital. The promotion 
of LNG imports is viewed by prominent SPD politicians as a retreat from the Energiewende.122 
In addition, domestic political imperatives may encourage Chancellor Merkel to continue to 
prioritise affordability over supply security. Political capital will also need to be expended on 
securing the acquiescence of the German energy industry to the Energy Union.123 However, 
Germany and Europe may pay a very heavy geopolitical price if Chancellor Merkel is not 
prepared to champion gas supply security.  
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